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In PrudentiaZ Insurance Company of America v. Wadford,1
our Court held that a real estate mortgage executed prior to
the filing of a judgment against the landowner based on an
account for merchandise prior to the execution of the mort-
gage had priority over the judgment even though the mort-
gage was not recorded until after the judgment was filed. The
judgment obtained did not change the creditor to a "subse-
quent creditor." Of course the recording statute is designed to
protect "subsequent" creditors and purchasers for value. The
Court refused to upset its later prior decisions, quoting
Cooley:
2
'When a principle is once adopted and declared by the
courts, the people have a right to regard it as just dec-
laration of the law, and to regulate their actions and con-
tracts thereby.... There should never be a disturbance
of the same, except upon urgent reasons and a clear man-
ifestation of error.'
What a relief would be achieved for practicing lawyers if
all appellate courts, and particularly the United States Su-
preme Court, would adhere to this well recognized principle
of law!
Carroll v. M & J Finance Corporation3 was an action for
conversion of an automobile brought against the mortgagee.
The facts showed that the only act by the mortgagee tend-
ing to prove conversion was that it advertised the automo-
bile for sale while it was in a body shop for repair, it having
been taken to the body shop by the owner. Sale of the auto-
mobile never took place as it was called off by the mortgagee.
The Court concluded that the lower court should have
granted defendant's motion for a directed verdict, saying:
It is not shown that respondent's possession of the
automobile was ever disturbed. It remained at the body
shop where she left it and so far as the record discloses,
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1. 232 S. C. 476, 102 S. E. 2d 889 (1958).
2. CooLEY, CONSTITUONAL LIMITATIONS (7th ed.) 325.




Published by Scholar Commons,
SURVEY OF SOUTH CAROLINA LAW
she was free to remove it at any time she saw fit. There
is no testimony that the Finance Corporation ever ex-
ercised any dominion or control over the automobile. It
is true that it wrongfully advertised the car for sale but
this without more is insufficient to constitute a conver-
sion.
A motion to strike certain allegations from the answer was
involved in Ward v. Federal Insurance Company.4 The plain-
tiff had recovered judgment against one Miller for injuries
received through the latter's negligence. Miller was an em-
ployee of a subcontractor of Sloan Construction Company,
who had been awarded a construction contract by the State
Highway Department. Sloan had procured a bond from the
defendant herein which guaranteed the "faithful performance
of the contract, including the payment of all lawful claims by
reason of injuries received in and about the construction."
The present action was based on the judgment obtained
against Miller and the bond.
In its answer to the complaint, the defendant alleged that
Miller was not responsible for the accident and that the judg-
ment was not binding on this defendant. These allegations
upon motion were struck from the answer.
In a 3-2 decision the Supreme Court affirmed the lower
court's decision saying that the law of agency was not in-
volved, but rather, suretyship. It concluded that since the
action was based on contract and the allegations quoted were
admitted by the answer, the judgment against Miller, who
was engaged in the construction, was binding upon the de-
fendant.
Justice Legge in the minority opinion felt that the stricken
portions of the answer above referred to should have been
left therein as the pleadings did not sufficiently disclose the
terms of the bond. He further indicated that the present judg-
ment may bring about greater liability on the part of the sure-
ty than imposed on the principal. This of course would be con-
trary to the well settled rule in regard thereto.
The right of subrogation by a mortgagee who extends a
loan in order to pay off a prior mortgage was involved in
Meaders Brothers v. Skelton.5 The facts disclosed that the
4. 233 S. C. 561, 106 S. E. 2d 169 (1958).
5. 234 S. 0. 134, 107 S. E. 2d 1 (1959).
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third mortgagee made a loan to cancel an existing first mort-
gage. The second mortgagee then contended that its mort-
gage had priority over the latter mortgage. Judge McGowan's
decree overruling such contention and holding that the latter
mortgagee was subrogated to the rights of the first mort-
gagee to the extent of payment of principal and interest on
its mortgage was adopted as the per curiam opinion of the
Supreme Court. This is in line with a prior decision of the
Court and certainly seems to do justice to the parties.
In relation to our recording statute the Supreme Court for
the first time had occasion to define the word "resides" as
used therein.6 It adopted the view expressed by the North
Carolina Supreme Court7 which had stated:
. . . It thus clearly appears that under these statutes
"residence" means something more than a place, and
something less than a domicile. The term clearly imports
a fixed abode for the time being.
The Court went on to say that the facts of the present case
presented a jury question as to where the mortgagor resided
when the mortgage in question was executed.
6. G. A. C. Finance Corporation v. Citizens and Southern National
Bank of South Carolina, 234 S. C. 205, 107 S. E. 2d 315 (1959).
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